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Council)
PRELIMINARY REMANKS
%
This nemorand.um cornprises two parte :
a) the main purpose of the first part is to describe the principaJ.
probl-ems encountered by the Comrnunity in obtaining nucS.ear f,uel
supp15-es, The numericaL data given in this part reflect the basic
trend of development of nuclear po$ter in the general context of
supply;
b) in the light of the general situation described in the firet part,
the second part corrtains a proposal for a Community supply policv
and describes the nain features thereofg
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TITTRODUCTION
1. I_he ne_!L snergy pq1ictr_ slrategy
Tbe main course of action proposed for the Comnunity by the Commission
in lts New Energy Po).icy Strate ey /eaMQ4) 55o tina;f is to resort to
the use of, nuclear polrer as quickly as possibLe; this course is
dictated by the need, to contain the rapid growth in the consunption
of oil products. In 1973, the Community was reliant on oil imports
for nore lhan 60% of its energy requirements; at the sane time the
risks of price increases and interruptions in suppLies becane stronger
and, balance-of-payments difficulties developed.
one of the measures advocated is to step up nucl-ear programnes; in
the r:rediun and Long tern, this is the rnost effective way- of l-imiting
the Communityrs d.ependence on inports.
2. Nuclear objectives
Close analysee of the pctentiaL expansion of electrLcity production,
which is the prefer:red way of exploiting nuclear energy, gives some
idea of the future market for nuclear electricity; such an analysis
had been rnade nade in ttMediurn Term Guid.elinee for the Electricity
Sector*(+Om(f+) 19?OlnUe target proposed for the new strategy is 2OO
GWe by the end of 1985; thls figure is slightly lower than the market
potential. In tbe longer tern, by the year 2.OO0, the proposed
target is to have nuclear electricity generating capacity in operation
which ie large enough to meet about 50% of totaL energy requirements;
1.OO0 GWe may be taken a6 a rough guide.
As regards the use of nuclear power for purposes other than electri-
city generationt the new strategy sets the target of a further contri-
bution of at least 1O%, to be achieved as aoon as possible; j.t would
t?--
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be desirable to achieve the equivalent of, 20 GWe as early ae 1)BJ,
but thls still- poses Problems.
These targets are not subetantLaLLy di.fferent from the forecastot
whicb are in any gase subJect to constant reviEion. For the year
1985, for Lnstance, the sum of the national targets of the Community
countries is constantly increasing '. 17O GWe were announced at the
beginning of 19?3, th GWe at the encl of that year and almost 17O
OWe at tbe present ttme. The latter figure fue not take into account
possible non-eLectrical appllcations uhoee economic appeal has been
substaniia3-Iy enhanced by the rieing cost of oiI. The effort proposeil
by tbe Commission in 1974 anounts to the overaLl antlclpation, by one
year, of national forecaete of installecl capacity on order and comple-
ted in the eLeven Yeare to cone.
3. &fs[€_ang_Ietur!
The Commissi.on realLzes that thie acceleration may create difficultles
j.n sone economic and social sectots. To ito ite best to help overcone
these problems, the Commlssion hae d,evieed a seriee of measures
RCOM(24) 10 flnat, vrb,lch it will lnitiate ltself but which will
only be really effective lf combined wlth meagures taken by the
Governnento and revel.ant induetrial circ].eo. Come what rnayr Buch an
effort is essential, the riEk incurred by the Community is not so
much that of only partj.ally closing the gap between the 1?O Gl^le
estimate arrived at by the Member States andl the 200 GWe proposed by
the Commission, as eeeing the procluction targete receding lnto tlre
future wlthout even that of 1?O GWe being achieved by the end of 1985'
Tbe neasures to be taken ln fielcts otber than that of nuclear fueL
supplies are descrlbed in other Commiselon Memoranda. At thie stage
we need only recall the implicatlone of the nuclear programmee
- 200 GWe wiLl reptreaent a level of consurnption of 24O milLion tons
of oiL in 1985;
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each unit of 1 GWe which has not been equipped in time with a
nuclear stean supply system wilL.have to be rnade good by a conven-
tlonal unit wbich, if oll-fueLled wllL burn 1,2 million tons of oiL
a year, or 18 million tons between 1985 ana AOOO.
4. Reference no<le1 :__pr:Lncipal, implica
The choice of a reference model is both arbitrary and nece66ary,
- it is arbitrary not only becauee of the unpredictability of requi-
rements in the medium term and beyond., but also because of the
present impossibil-ity of predicting with reasonable accuracy the
relative shares of the nuclear market which witL be accounted for
by the different reactor types over the long term.
- 
it is nonetheless necessary because r.re must be able to analyse the
consequences and implications of a trend which is galning ground
rapidLy whatever happens.
Slnce the fixing of brackets around average values would introduce
an element of false certalrty and a clefinite.risk of confusion in the
tabres, it was felt preferable to refer to only one development hypo-
thesis anil cleliberately to give it the virtue of rtround figures'.
This rgfe_lqqee-tnoqel is therefore neither a forecast nor a target, but
simply a guide. The relevant figures are as follows :
Fastreactors 1 5 ZA
------r- ---_____
HTR reactors
(t ) ccn; AGR, EIIR, and
20
LWR
19?5 1980 1985 1990
Nuclear capacj.ty in
operation (GWe) 6s 200 400
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From the supply lolnt of vlew, the maln lnplications are ae follows i
Materiala
or (1)6erv].ce6
Annua1 requirenents
materiale servlces
Years u(ro] t) sl.lu (1olt) Repr. (to} t)
1975
lg8o
1985
2t
50 
'o
1r7
10
25
otl
1
t
Thts bypothesls only covers uranium-fue1led reactors. I'rom the point
of, view of, supplLes, tbor{um-fue1led reactore poee similar prob}eme.
=-=-=-=-=-= -
5. Ialegrated fuq}ll,gg-st:s.ten.l q{an .
Slnce the reactor typee choeen by the Menber States to cope wlth the
nediurn-terrn objectives of tbeir nuclear programoea are alL fuelled
on enricbed uraniun, from the supply point of view only one programne
is needed to cover tbe production of uraniun, lte enrichnent and -
at a later date - the reBrocessing of irradiated fuel,er which tbua
nake up an integrated f,uelling systen. In terme of r-equLrenentst there
le a direct relation between tbe quantitles of ndrral uranlun and
enrl,chment work and the quantities of plutonium and uranLun obtatned
by reproceeelng.
Tbie relatlbn does, bowever, contain an element of flexibility, de-
pencllfrg on i
- 
tbe talLs a66ay cboeen by the enrichrnent plants (margin of 3 15 ?6),
and
-'the quantfttes of pJ,utonium chosen for recycling (probabl'e savJ.ng
of, about fi% of uranium and enrichment requiremente).
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Tbis flexibility can be expl-oiteit to alLow short-terrn adJustnents of
suppliest thereby Leseening the rtsk of a temporatXr shortage or surplus;
such meaeufes are simiLar to the adJustments achieved by juggLing r,rith
stocks. Tl:e frexibility disappears in the event of structural
shcrtages.
Another feature of the conditione of supply is the structural- link
between uranium and, its enricbment r aome countries in possession
of large deposits of uranium r+hicb more than cover their orrn requi-
rements are showing an incr:asing desire to deveJ.op an enrj-chment
capabiJ-ity, tbe output of '*hi.ri': they might tben export. Thus, for
the Commun:ty, access to th: ur.:.nium of
Canadar Soutir Africa or Austraija eouLd eoon take the form of tbe
clirect purchaee of enriched uranium or participation in the establlsn-
ment of enrichment facilities in tbese countries.
fhe inter raiationehip between uraniun supplies, the provision of
enrichment services and the reprocessing of irrad.iated fuels means
that the prob}ems arislng at the respective etages cannot be treated
separately 
"
6,
The cri.s6-cro6s of decision-making in this integrated system of
nuclear fuel suppLies ie now being made more compLex than ever by the
escaLation in the requirements of, most ind.ustrialized countries,
whereas the leal time neceosarJ in order to match supplies to the
leveL of demarrd can bardly be reduced,.
In the next ten years, annual requlrements throughout the wor3.d nay
even triple every five years. But in the same periocl Leacl times
wiLl remain as follows :
1-
-\
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- 
fron four to seven years to build. an enrichment plant or d'ouble the
capacity of an existing Plant;
- 
t'ron six to nine years to d.esign, build- and- bring into service a large
reprocessing Plant;
- 
from seven to ten years to discover a, uraf}ium d.eposit and' begin prod-uction;
- 
fron tlo to three years to increase production frorn a d'eposit already
being vlorked.
The estiraated. increase in d.emand. is u:cdoubted"Iy a strong incentive for
setting up ad.eg'ua,te prod.uction facilities, but the scale of the investment
entailed. by an lnd.ividual d.ecision on t;hese l-ines - together with the period'
which elapses before a profit is mad.e act as a d.eterrent.
In the face of such rapid.ly expand.ing d-emand, these lead tirnes a?e not flexible
enough to allow supplies to catch up or even lessen the threat of short-ter"n
- 
or structr:ral - shortages.
Since an investorrs d.ecisions are naturally d.ictated. by the confidence he
has in his access to the narket, it nust be ad&itted at thi"s stage that past
achievements in the nuclear field have rarely been in tine with forecasts and
prograrunes; nany ind.ivid.ual decisions have been taken hastilyr either because
the narket had. not expanded as expected, or because supplierc were unable to
secure their expected. share of the market. This is just as true for those
d.irectly encouraged- by the public authorities as for those acting on their own
initiative. This d.iscrepancy betr,'een reality and. forecasts has engendered
a sceptical reaction a.nd a wait-and.-see attitud.e - or even reluctance - on
the part of investors faced by successive reviews of programme.
Without guestionlng its legitimacy, r"Ie must from novr on consid.er such behaviour
to be intolerable since the ertensive use of nuclear power has becone
inperative and will soon becorne absoLutely vital and also because the nuclear
contribution to the Conrnunityrs enerry supplies
-a-
(via cheaper e}ectricity) will admit no more than a very 6mal1 degree
of flexibiLi.ty. But, on the other hand, actuaL demand must areo
be aligned to a pro8ramme of properly aseessed requirements. tr'or
instancerit is conceivable that for several yeare in succeesion
electricity producers will buy more fuel- than they actualJ-y require,
and then suddenly, when they feel their etocks are eufficient or even
exceeeive, wiJ"J- suspend their purchases or even put back some of thelr
stocks on the nnarket, thereby causing a grave d.isturbance in the'
conditions of oupply by the effect of their own bebavlour.
Consequently, nuclear power is a subJect on which decision - making
must hence forth berrintell"igentrf 
- 
if not at worLd Level, then at
Least at Community leve1 
- 
to ensure a satiefactory degree of stabi-
Lity on the nuclear fuel rnarket, whicb is by nature essentially
unstable because of the juxtaposition of a very fast growth of
demand and very long Lead times.
-8-
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MITURAI UNA$IU],I
The ir::po:rtant role now attributed to nrolear enerry Bakee it essential to
ensure tlrat arleq11ate supplies of uraniur: are avaiLa,bLe to the CoEmunlty.
Since the lsxovm indiginous resources of uraniur ore w'ithin the Conuaunity
are relativeS.y snall (ttrough not insignificarit) compared with needs, tin:ely
srrsnger,rents have to be nade so that supplies may be obtained- fron: a d'iver-
sity of sourccs outside the Conrnunity. Security of zupply and reasonable
prices are the essential points to be ooverecl in such a$a,nger,rents.
1.@
The first inportant d.emand for uranitrn
result of intensive prospecting in the
sits were id.errtifiedr aJId' brought into
a naxinwi of 34.000 tonnes U per anmm
a fairly constant anrmal procluction of
was for nilitarY Purposes and. as a
Lglr}ts and. 1950ts sizeable ore d'epo-
production. This production reached
Ln 1959 a.nd then d.eclined. by 1965 to
about half this amount.
Tbe uranirrm production industry which rose to the challenge of this rnilitary
d.eraand. for a new nineral (for whiclr new technologies had to be d'eveloped)
thus entered a longr C"epresscd. period when nrines had to be closed-l sta.ff
laid.-off a,nd, rooreover, prices obtainable hard.ly covered costs. The expected
non-nilitar/ de;aa;rd for r:raniun was slow to riaterialize.
This narhet glut virtually stopped prospecting for ura,niun by nining cora-
panies a;rd aLso brought about the constitution of stoclcpiLes totaUin8
about ?T.OOO tor:nes nainly by produccr country govelrnsient intervention.
This large stockpile overhanging the narket together with several over-
optiraistic forecasts of deriand. for rarclear power stations rmde trraniur.r pro-
ducers reluotarrt to engage f\.rrther prospectir:g effort or investment'
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The price of uraniu.n (mrch of whicb had, been profltabLe at g 8 per I'b.
U30B) d'eclined. to around. {} 5 per l.b. or even less. Consequcntly it was
no strrprise that several producers (outsid.e the U,S.A.), cliscr:.sse{ irow
they could, protect tlrenselves against such narket cirorrnstanceg. In gene-
ra1, a41' appcal to userg to pay none realistlc pricos went untreed.ed..
2. l{arket Fevivgi
With substa,ntlal ord.ening of rnrolear poldor stations, particular.ly in ilro
U.S, (t*rere no less thanlo) fO7 GWe were ordere{ in the 3 yeare IgTf 
- ?3),
appreciable contracte for uranlun zupply were concl,ud.od.i priceo becane
nore renunerative and prospoctlng actlvity increased., However, the U.lin.
naintained. an er.ibarp on inported. rua^niun to protect d,onostic industrf/,
so foreign producens were cLenied aecess to this rirajor na,rket. I{evertheless,
these [oD-UrS. proclucers eha,red. in the inproved. narket cond.itions, and.
eeveral of then bega,n to openate pnicing pol-ioies which they ha.d. a,greed. upon
nutuall,y.
3. Donend. befrjns to exceed. Offcr,
The lnproving d.eriand. and. the vlrtual certainty of r,rarliet growth due to the
inpoltant nuclear progtannes undertaken has 
- 
ovor the past year 
- 
lead to
a conplete reverelal of condlitions fron a rrtntrlrerte narhetn to a trsel].errs
naltkettt. Invitations to btd. during 1!J{ have evoked- few or even no off,ers.
As there cannot be a real narket sborta6e induced. so rapid.Iy, it io presunod.
that sone nrppliers at leastr are holding-back their offer until thene ie
a bigger certainty of prices obtainable.
MeanwhiLe, contracts which have been conclud.ed. in L974 have attracted. prices
exceed.ing $ 1O per Ib, U30g f,or d.el.ivery in the nert year or so, ancl, even
oxceed. $ 20 per Lb. in the eanly 1!80ts.
x) A granual lifting of this enba,rgo is proposed.
over the perlod 1978 to L984.
.- \\' - l0 -
4- New Policies of Producer States
Sinultaneously l,"ith the narket revival for uranir:m and. with the recollec-
tion of the reeent enerry crisis in mind", the nain prod.ucer states r^iith
uranir:m reserves, have begr:n to re-d.efine their policies over foreign
or,mership and. export. This reconsid.eration in the prod.ucer states i-s
inspired- by u:ed.erstand.able notives of assuring their ot'n needs of nuclear
fuels an6 of pronoti-ng the optimr.u prosperity of their olrn ind.ustry by
ad.d.i-ng rnaxinum value to their natural resources. Sone of the nain
producer states outsid.e U.S.A.1 €.go Canad.a has recently outlined (though
not d.efined) trer policy, South Africa has ind.icated the broad. principles
of herrs, but Australi-a has inposed. a, uranium export enbargo pending
consj-deration of her position.
5.
Mear*fuile, the Coruounity based. uraniurn producers, who have uranir:m prod.uc-
tion and.r/o" prospecting activities in many trmrts of the worId (bottr in
d.eveloped. and" d"evelopi-ng countries) outsid.e the Connunity are exposed to
considerable r:ncertainty as to r,rhat they vril1 be permitted. to producer ol,tl
and export and. r:nd.er which fiscal cond.itions. Ttris is currently a severe
d.isincentive to their activities, and imped.es their role in helping to
assure uranium needs of the Comraunity.
The target reconmended by the Connission to satisfy some 17 a/b of a1'L enerry
need.s with nuclear enerry by 1985 
- 
inplies that the ral{ material should.
be available in adecuate and secure or:antities and at reasonable prices.
rrReasonable pricestt meatrls that all legftimate costs, including provision
for erploration costs to replace reservesr should. be covered- plus an
adeqr:ate profit incentive to attract investnent.
^ t)-
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6. Uranir:m Resources
(a) lrre 1973 EIiEA/rAEA repo*(r) provides authoritative d.ata base for this
topic together with a resource cLassification. It is importa.nt to d.istin-
guish betvreen the d.ifferent categories of resources (as d.efined. in the
report). 0n1y one of these is eguivalent to reserves in the mining sense,
the other resource categories have a much higher d.egree of uncertainty.
It can be misleading to add all the resource categories together except
as a broad. indication of a potential resolrrce base. Most of thi-s potential
resor..rrce base has yet to be explored. and assessed for econonic possibilities.
If, hor.rever, l.,.ith this qua.lification the estiraates for resource categories
up to $ t5 per lb. are added., a figure of about 3.25 nitlion tonnes U
ie ind-icated. Reasonably assured. resources up to $ tO per Ib. are estinated.
at 886.000 tonnes.
(l) uore recent figures for uraniun reserves are given in Nininge"t'"(e)
updating of the ENEA/IAXA figures:
WORLD NESER\TES tr/
(Reasonably assured. resources
$ rO per Ib. U30B).
thousand.s of
tonnes U
up to
u. s. A.
South & S.l{. Africa
Canada
Australia
France
Connunity Associated. States :
Niger
Gabon
0ther
260
200
185
160
37
2T
2T
19
r7
4
4
2
5
40
20
45
947 100
x) Exclusive of China, USSR ancl East European States (for r,rhich no d.ata
is available).
Uranium'Resources Prod.uction & Denand" 
- 
OECD, Paris (f971).
Nininger, R. IAEA, Vlenna 
- 
Proceed.lngs of Athens Spnposir:n (rylq).
(r)
(z)
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7. Uranirm leraa"nd.
The saae mW/Une repont evaluated. world. need.s as a firnction of clifferent
htrpotheses of nucl-ear power gowth and. of the contribution of d.ifferent
reactor types. The following table sur$ariges the naximrul need.s foreseen
at the mornent. Althougir - because of the lrorld.rc new energy narket situa-
tion 
- 
it is inpossible to give the precise figures, it can be foneseen
tha'i; the d.eu'and wil"l tend to increase after 1!80 conpared. to the figures
ind.icated.
Worlil lleecls of Uraniurn
(in thousarrds of tonnes)
Iear r973 r975 lg8o L9B5 1990
Anrrual
needs
C\:mulative
needs
26
64
11
t7
65
297
L27
799
224
u13
The neerls of the Community are about a guarte:r of the world. regui.rernents.
B. Satisf.irine the Demand.
The present world. proriuction qf uraniun is about 15.000 tonnes per yeart
but this rate of produetion wiLl need to inorease extrernely rapld.Ly to foLlou
the projected dernand. It ehould be realised that the denand growth shown
above exceed.g the correspond.ing rna:cirnun gror,rth rate over a,ny 20 year period
in t,:is century for such commod.ities as petroLeunr copper o:r zinc. E\en
without any of the pro'oleras ind.icated. in paras. 1O and 11 above, this woulal
be alr exacting task for the industry conoerned..
- 
\+-
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It ehould. be enphasised that it takes I to 10 yea,rs f,ron the prospecting
stage to find. and. bring an uranirrn orebody into proctuction, Thus, flrch
work ghould. be rrnd.ertaken on an approprlate soale of effort and investnent,
and for conmercial reagong fulI produotlon frora an;r given orebo{y can only
be sustained. provided. that a foruarcl treserve of et least 8 yeara production
has been proved*. There are other factols, inctud.ing environnental consid.e-
rations, wbioh also tend. to reetriot the proctuction fron nines and associated.
ore-treatnent plants.
9. The poor d'iscovery rate in finding uranirrn cl,eposits drrring the last cl.ecad.e
is due to the following tcagon$r First the linrited, riek firrance allocated.
to rfaniurn ocploration due to the d.epreeeed, price. Thie investment now has
to be nade. Seoond.J.y, uraniun exploration bae passed, lnto a sta€e uhere the
nore obvlous targets have been tested, flrtlo deepen, harder to find. resources
rust be located. a.nd. areas that were lese attractlve targets clue to goog"a,-
phical or politloal reasons sbouldl. now be consid.ered.
In ord.er that deeper targets can be identlfled., research mrst be fostered.
into new ercploratlon nethod.s. The cortrol of uranium nineralisation needs
to be bette:r rrrclerstood and the beneficiation of uranirrn fron low-€rad.e oreg
irnproved.r as proposed. in |tEnergy for Etuoper Research & Developnentrt 
- 
SEC
Qil asgz finar,
In the short tern, utaniurl strpply to the Corunrnity will be cl.oninated. by its
dependenoe on a va,riety of, foneign tresouroeB. The Connunity wiLl look to
Canadar South Africa, Australia, Cowurrlty Associated. States and d.eveloping
countrlee for its aupplles. l.tarket security will necesgitate a d.iversity
of these supplies brr[ the Corununity wi].I be in conpetltion for theee world-
wid.e nesoutcegr the USA wiLl soon become a net innporter ancl. eould. p'.:rchase
up to Nfo of its ne.eds frorn fo:reign soruces in the t9gOrs. Japanrs nucleal
proglarilner 
"epnesentl4g a thircl of that of the Connunltiesl prograrone is a].so
coropeting for its need.s fron worldwlcle sourc€sr
It ie thus esgential thet the Comunity ehouLd. eng€ge in a d.ialogue with
producer ootrntrieE to find out the cond.itionE under which uraniun orpplies
nay be ae$red. to the Conntmity und,er balanced cond.itlons of mrtwl intereEt.
*) ln the case of most q:rnent South African reeerves,
uraniun is a bi-product of golct production, and for this reason the
output of uraniurn is likely to be less tha.n 7.000 tonnes per annun,in spite of the 3.arge size of, the reserves.
lJ 
- 
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With the present higher prices rullng viable ura.lriun exploration targets
are probably available vrithin the Community.* Detailed evaluation of these
possibilities could provid.e an lnd.igenous resource base contributing
to Commr:nity future policy for uranium supply; at leastr it could provid-e
a securitY T€s€FVeo
In viers of the new policieg of certain proilucer countries (see Secti-on4)t
it is 1ike1y that Conmrnlty industzy l^ri11 have to take part in the d.evelopnent
of enrichment faciLities in these countries and that the Connunlty tr"ilI have
to obtaln some of i-ts enriched uraniun su.pplles from them.
10.@
The structure of the uraniurn producing industry is cliverse: includ.ing private
netal nining companies, lnternatlonaL oil companies to an increasing ertentt
and a number of specially constituted coutpanies with varying.degrees of state
control and sponsorshiP.
Conpanies of all these types, either based in the Connunity or for lthich there are
importapt Community flnancial interests, are promlnent in uraniurn expioration and
production. In 19?3 about j of the vrorlcl production of uranium was accounted-
for by such companies. Tlris, however, does not necessarily reflect the iroportant
potentlal role of such companies. this, honeve?, d.oes not necessarlly reflect
the irnportant potentiaL role of such conpanies in the future. For examplet
nost oi1 conpanies are relatlvely nerr to uranium r,torkl but as a d,eliberate policy
of d.iversification, tbey have allocated oonsid.erable resources to uranium
exploration. In addition rnention must be made of the worldwid.e continuous ancl
intensive efforts since the 1950rs of the French CEA and associated Frenoh companies.
fhis expertise has resulted. in inportaat discoveri-es of economic reserves, not
only in France but elsewhere notably in lfiger, Gabon and ln Canada. Of more
recent for:nd.ation are conpanies based. in Gernany and Italy set up specifically
to find. and develop uranium reserves.
Clearly ar$r cornrnon Conmrmity ,policy for the supply of na,tural uranir:ra must
includ"e an inportant role for such companies because of their erperiencer financial
resources and potential to help provid.e a si.gni-ficant proportion of Commr:nity
need.s. In addition they can bring Cornmunity developed. technolory to bear on this
task to the benefit of the producer countries, but this role can only be reaLized.
if these companies can be assur€d of acceptable terns for:
(a) tire right of access to territory,(b) narketing the product,(c) sure access to a reasonable proporti-on of the Cornnunity rnarket.
x Apart fron the reserves in France of about 4O.OOO tonnes rvhich curyently
support a production for donesti-c need.s of 1JOO tonnes per annum.
-15-
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Sin':e r:-ost countries have chosei: reaotor faniLies ftrelled. on enriched.
urai:i.ur:, thie r:aterial has becor:e vitelly inporta.nt to the Conr.:unityrs
nuclear fuel supply" The present situation as rega^:rd.s supplies of en-
richecl uraniun to the Cormrnity is cond.itioned. by two separate problei,:s:
(a) supplyir:g the power plants which will be regui:ring their fi.est fuel
bcfore I july 19829
(t) supplying the porrer pla:rto nhich will be reguiring their first firel
after that date.
The above d.ates comespond. to the d.eadlines laid. clown by the USAEC for
the conclusion of lor:6-tern contracts, which nea;r they have been inevitably
inposed. on users throughout the worlcl in view of the virtuaL nonopoly held.
by the US.&EC in uraniun er:richnent u:rtil recently.
]. $EPplYrNq.T@ PQ".m PI MS I$IIC
Conriunity users have tried. to d.iversify their supply sourceE for this
series of reactors by applying to;
(a) nuopean proclucers (EtlRoDIF, unmlco) 9
(t ) 
" 
Soviet producer (nucisimgsPoFr);
(") *, Ar:erican pnoducer (uu.nc).
Drring late 1971 and. early L974 tr\ropean prod.ucers witnessed. the satura-
tion of the production capacities planned. in their respective d-evelopnent
progre*rJes; sone of then were even unable to neet orderg receive'.l frcri
Dtropean usergr
3
-.\"\ --
The E\ropean usels
conclud.e contracts
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whlcb approached. TEIITISIIABDiPOR$ founil it possible to
on reasonable and. fairly fiexlble terns.
Wlth regard. to zupplies fron the US.IEC, difflorlties arose for the Cor.c:urity
lrecause of the new criteria it had set in }rlay 1973 for the concLusion of
coati.acts, These criteria invoLvecl fairly strict trading terus and the
stipulation that new long-tern contracts shoulcL henceforth be conclud.ed.
eight years before the f,irst d'efiver;'. The application of these criteria
was, ho$ever, subject to a transitionai. period. during which:
(a) in the first phaserutiLitiee reguiring their firet f\rel before L July
l9?8 should conclud.e their contracts with the USI,TC before l1 Deceribor
I9?3 (three Corlnrnltyutilities ooncluded. their contracte before this
date);
(t) in the gecond phaserurbil,tties:reguirir:g their first firel between 1 July
I9?8.and JO Jrure l!82 should conclude their oontracts with USAEC by 3O
June 1974 at tho latcgt. 0n that date the BSAEC traE unable to accopt
all thc orrLorE reoclved for the follmrtng reasons!
(i) 
" 
year ago, the I;'S/i.EC estinatecl that, between spring and autun L974r
it would. have reached. the linit of the contractual connitnents n'hich
the Congtess had laid down for it in the tight of available capaoity'
Depend.ing upon whether pLutonlun wag recycled. or not, t^re linit was
Eet at 382 or 275 CWe respectively;
(ii) since rnrcloar progranries throughout the world. have been stepped up as
a result of the enerry crisis, the nru:rber of appl.ications for long-,
terr: contracts on 30 June 19?4 exceed.ed. previous estir,ratesr
_\g*
-t7-
The USAifCr which until then had firnly connitted. itself for 273 Glrle, was
obligecl to reconsid.er the uhole situation and. d.ivide the difference be-
tween the total a,nount finrly ordered. (3e4 CI'le), and the ar:orrrrt alread.y
corui:ittetl by contract (eZf AW") into two categories:
(a) for the first category, up to a ceiling of about 120 GWe, the USAI,"C
has couclud.ed. firtr long-terr: supply contracts (all US reaotors are in-
clud.ed. in this category, tog;ether with five Connunity reactors ancl 28
other reactors elsewhere in the worlcl)i
(U) ttre second category'inclucles {J non-iLirerican reactors rrit}r which the
USIIEC is willing to conclude cond.itionaL contracts for a Cate as yet
urrspecified brrt situatecl sonewhere near the end. of 1974 $8 Corx.nrnity
reactors are incluCed. in this categorlr). For con-i;racts to be concluded
before this d.ate, the US/IEC reserves the right of cancellabiora if the
statutory provisions allowing plutoniur: reeycling in the United States
are not approved. by 30 &me 1975, tr\rtherllore, at Least sone of these
contracts r:ay be cancel-leC on certain conditions if private enrichnent
facilities are firnly d.ecicled. upon,
rtpart fror:: the coirnitnents which r:ay naterialize fron these cond.itional con-
tractsrthe US.{LTC will txrd.ertake no contractual corurj.tnents to supply reactors
requiring their first f\rel after L July 1982.
The problens of cond.itional contracts arises because of the inconeistency
between the 1ega1 situation ir:posed by Congress on the USAEC (contracting
capacity) e^rr1 the actual situation which deternines the final d.ate by which
new capacities r.ust be brought into operation (new capacity reguirernents).
Ho$ever, in a staterent nade on 5 inrgust L974t the US president assured the
holders of cond.itionaL contracts that, whatever happened., the United. States
woulcl r:eet the cor:r:it:rents laicl clowe in these contracts.
,1 
-
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Confbonted. by this situation the Cor:riission and trtrraton Supply Agency took
steps to try and alleviate the difficultles facing Duropean users rrho were
invitecl. to subscribe to conclitional contracts.
Tho principal steps taken were as followel
(a) postponing the f,inal date originally set to 31 gotober L974t
(ir) oUtaining fron the USADC reciprocity clauses rega,rding possible
cancellation of, contractsi
(c) ocploring the possibilities of taktr6 over firn contracts froir
irnerican trgerse
Provided. that the problens created. by the cond.itional contractg ere re-
Eolved. it seeus that, rrntll L9B2t aLL the requirer.ents of, userE will'oe
covered, perhaps even with a safety i::,a.rgin. firBODIF a;rd URH{CO posses
sgpplenentary and recerve quantities in various f,orns. fhus, on the wholet
the supply situation up to 1982 appgers relatively satisfactory.
2. glryPrnNq o{']wPJs
J,nfER 
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This is r*rere the f\ryrd.anental strategic probLen of Co;mrrnity supplies
arises, because - as statecl earlier - it Ls now certain that the U$I^EC cart
no longer lnclertake contractual coruiitnents to stl,pply fueL to reactorS
regtrlring their firgt deLiveries after 1 July 1982,
Any zubseguent possibility of access to a private or Governnent-owned'
ilnelican Eon:rco will therefore d.epend on the cleclgions which private industry
night take to build. new faciLitieE or, failing such decisions, eteps t*tich
the Anerican Governnent wouLd 'oe obligecL to take to engr.re the continuity
of supplies.
The finaL date by which private inlustry should, talce a d.ecision seellg to
be the end of 1975.
- 
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There is thus a period" runnrng to the beginning of 1976 in which it r"riI1 be
inpossible to obtain firm supply cornrnitments frorn the llnited, States for
first d.eliveries to be nade after 1 July 1982.
The begiruri.ng of 1975 is not too late to coruoission new enrichment facilities
without interrupting the flovr of d.onestic or foreign supplies, However, such
a long period. of contract r:ncertainty nay prejud-ice the smooth d.evelopment of
nucLear por."'er, and consequently the general enerry situation, includ.ing that
of the Comnunity.
In view of this basic strategic problem it is therefore essential for the
Comrnunity to be able to rely on an adeguate contribution fron its own producers
and., in particular, to find. out in the near future on what terrns and- i-n lrhat
qr:antities EiIIRODIF and. UIENCO r"rould. be willing to und-ertake firn cornmitments
in the nert fer,r nonths to supply enriched uranium frorn I July 1!82 onward-s.
Thus for the year 1985, the supply situation estimated" on the basis of the
criteria chosen by COPENUR* is as folIor.rs:
- 
Community reguirements
- 
sure supplies:
( non-European source s )
(European sources)
- 
remaining d.emand.
1! million
13 nillion
+
+
sl'iu
SIiru
(+)
(e)
6 nilli.on t SWU
The figure given for renaining d-enand d.oes not allow for the operating stocks
which operators are seriously consid,ering building up and which could begin
to have an impact on demand by the end of this decade. Furthermore, the annual
increase of requirements in the two or three years following 1!Bl r^'i11 be in the
region of 4 million tfyear of Si{U.
r€ COPENUR: Stand.ing Comnittee for Uranium Enrichment.
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The traro European prod,ucers consid.er thal; new investment d-eci-sions coufd be
taken by mid-l!J), provid.ed. that European users und.ertake firm commit-
ments enabling them to plan their operal;ions for several years ahead on a
reasonably assured- basis and. with satisllactory terms of supply. In the
longer -berm, the Comrm:nity lrill have to envisage the participation of natural
uranium prod.ucinE cormtries in the enri.ohment process.
I
i
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l. plutonir:rn is the id-eal fuel for breeder reactors and has the great auality
of revita;'6rng d.epleted. uranir.rml it can therefore make a significant con-
trj-bution to the Conmunityrs long terrn supplies. This r,ril1 d.epend- heavily
on the rate of development of breed.er reactors for electri-city generation.
Until the plutonir:m prod.uced- by thermal reactors - and. thus alread.y a.vailable
- 
is cornpletely absorbed. by fast breeder reactors, there remains the problem
of choosing the best method. of managing the accumulated. cruantities.
2. Three types of plutonium storage are possible: inside irradiated fuel elementst
in the state in r,ihj-ch plutonium is removed, fron these elenents and.r a,fter
lnsertion in nen fuel elements, by recycling in thernal reactors.
(a) :!gl3gg_g!-lll3gfg!g1-!ggl-91999!ts containing the generated plutonium;
even aLlot,ring for the construction of the requisite pools for the
operation, this solution is the cheapest in initial investment and
is justified. until a genuine market developsl
(l) g!.gf3gg_gl-Blglglgg ertracted" from irradiated- fuef elenents, tr"hich is
more costly but has the ad.vantage of launching the reprocessing ind.ustry
grad.ually and- the ecrually appreciable advantage of having the plutonlum
read-i1y available. This solution poses certain safekeeping problens
(storage and. transport) because plutonium is both highly toxic and stra-
tegically important; but since these problens will eventually have to
be solved on a large scale, it i.:ould. only be a suestion of anticipation.
O a.z
tt
(c) Recycling in thermal reactors is undoubted.ly the solution which requires
the nost investnent and research, but it also presents und.oubted. advan-
tages: fi-rst of all it is a plutonium storage method' r'rhich is dovetailed'
into a system of energy prod.uction r,rithout loss of enerry fron the product
stored.l i-t prepares the ind.ustry for reprocessing and manufacturing
plutonium-bearing fuel elements, which vd11 be essential operations in
breed-er reactorsl fina11y, and- above a11., it contributes the requisite
flexibility for-a possible saving of about 1O % in the 'ruranium enrichnentrl
fuelllng system-. Provid.ed" that the conrnercial operati-on of breed.er reactors
is suitably planned, recyeling need. not g;ive rise to a plutonium shortagel
it is enough for the necessary guantities to be imnobilized - or reserved - with
a period. of notice of fi-ve years.
In ord-er to enable the Comnunity to accrui.re the technologi-cal knovt-hot',' which
it rdll need. if it uses this technique the Comnisslon recently forward.ed.
proposals to this effect to the Council, under the Euratom Progra.mme
of fnd.irect Projects.
a
-Thermal reactors.
-LII*
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The main reason for reprocessing j-ruad-iated. fueIs, from the supply poj-nt of
viewr i-s to ertract the fissi-le materials contained. therein, narnely slightly
enriched. uraniumland plutoniun produced. by the irrad.iation of the uranium.
Reprocessing thus constitutes a uranium-recovery operation and. a plutonium-
producing activity; it is an essential feature of a nuclear fuel supply policy.
In the Comrnunity, the prospects for reprocessing uraniun oxid.e fuels are at
present as follovrs:
(") Facilities2
(i) ttre 3NFL plant (w:.nd,scale, w) i.vill resurne activity tn r)16,
when j-ts capacity should be gradually brought up to Qoo tfyear;
in f!Bf/82 it is planned. to raise the capacity of BNFL to 8Oo t/year
at least.
(ii) tire cEA plant (La Hague, France) will handle some 100 tfyear in
1975 then prog?ess gradually to 8OO t/year in 1!80.
(iii) the IGWA plant (ce::nany), r,,hi.ch is not yet bui1t, r.riIl have a
capacity of I loo tf year and should becone operational by r9$f g4.
These three plants have signed. an agreement to forur a joint subsid.iary,
United Reprocessors Gmbh (UnC).
These capacities will suffiee for the recruirenents of European (includ_ing Spanish,
Swed.ish and- Sr^riss) users r:nti.l 1980. Setween 1!80 a^nd. it984 a shortage of reproces-
sing facilities may arise. However, it rrill not be possible to offset this ,ihortage
either by establlshing further facilities, since it takes six to nine years to
designr bui-ld and. bring into service a large pIant, nor by having recourse to
outsid,e facilities because these will be even more tightly stretched. than those
in Europe.
I
-The reprocessing of natural uranj-um fuels poses no supply problens, because its
contribution will become marginal.
2Th""" is also the Eurex 1 plant r,,'j-th a capacity of 25 tf yeat r.;hich could later befollor.red by Eurex 2 with a capacity of 3OO tfyeat, but at an unspecified date.
-t,-
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Hence, the excess facilities nhich, less than a yeaT ago, i-t i,as thought r.roul-d
not be resolved until about 1985 no longer feature in the forecasts. There are
tr,":o nain reasons for this:
- 
reprocessing ',rj-11 be feeli-ng the impact of mor.e anbitious nuclear electricity
progranmes vy i979f t98o ;
- 
plant d.esigns are having to be revlsed because of the d.ifficulty of solving
certain technical- problems on a,rr industrial scale.
b) Relation betl','een reprocessing and. managenent of radioactive r"este
An inevi-tab1e by-product of the reprocessing of irradiated" fuels i-s radioactive
vraste, partlcularly high-activity lraste.
The technico-econonic characteristics of reprocessing are such that, d.uring the
nert ten years, it t^ri.ll be advisable to bui.ld. plants on a scaLe which exceed.s
the requlrernents of natlonal nabkets. This was in fact one of the reasons wfur
the above-mentioned. URG was forrned.l 1ts imnediate consequence is the development
of a Cornrounity reprocessing market.
tlnt1l technioues for solidifying radioactive hraste have become ind"ustrially vlable
and. a method and policy of perrnanent storage have been chosen, thi.s waste ls con-
d,j-tioned. in liouid foru and there are argu.nents to justify its storage on the site
of the reprocessing p1ant. However, the concentration of facilities ln a smaLl
number of integrated. plants 
- 
r.:hj.ch is sound- po11cy not only for economic, industrial
and. comnercj-a} reasons but aLso because it haryresses develolnent efforts together 
-
can in the short term raise a d"j.ffi.cult question of responsibility; to r^,'hat
extent a.nd. und.er l.;hat cond.itions can the authorities of the countries where such
plants are sited. ag?ee to have vaste of foreign origin stored. on their territory?
The solution must be found through a Comnunity poli-cy 
- 
or if possible an inter-
national policy 
- 
of waste nanagernent, 1,.'hic.h clearly establishes the sharing of
responsibllity. The Cornmission is preparing proposals on thls subject t;hich it
rrrill" forn'ard- to the Cor:ncil under its environmentaf policy.
Although thls is not strictly a 'supplyf problem, it nay affect the supply situatj-on
adversely if a satisfactory solution is not found. at an early d-ate.
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The investnent required. for supplying the Conrar:nity with nuclear fuels as
-t
d.escrlbecL abover/rnay be estinated- as follows:
(in milli-on urao )
Lg75 1980 L975/U L985 t975/85
l{atr:ral uranir:m (nining) 7I 150 695 L67 L492
f,brichnent faciLities 48 478 2?AB 65t 49L4
Reprocessing facilities ?6 28 29O 982
lrg 6sq 297r Llo8 ?3BB
Resulting turrrover will be as folLows in L9B5:
(in million urar)
ECONICMIC ASFtrCTS
- 
Natural ura,niusl
tJ u.a./rb. (5orooo t)
- 
Ehrichment
lo u.a./kg (e5rooo t)
- 
Reprocessing
Bo u.a./ks (er65o t)
1 650
1 580
2r2
i.e.' a total turrrorrer of about 3 5OO nillion u.a.l.
(f ) No account has been taken of V,ogl UF6 conversion, translnrt,
fabrication of fuel el-enents anil mam.agement of radio-actirre waste.
-E-
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Part II
Essential featlf@
A. Introd.ucti-on
1. Iblw@
An analysis of the general situation and featr:res of the supply of nuclear fuels
(natural ura.nium, enriched, urani-um and plutoniurn) reveals the scope and complexity
of the problens to be solved. in a new energf policy stratery in order to assr:re
the Corum:nity of satisfactory supply cond.itions.
The following figures show the scope of these problems over the nert ten years :
- 
the aruura,l denand for nuclear fuels will lncrease almost tenfoldt
- 
the corresponding capital investnent for production of materials and services
alone will a,mor.mt to nearLy 71000 mi-llion 11o&r t
- 
the turnover in this sector could-, folloldng cunent trend.sr be 31500 nillion
u.a. in 1lB) alone.
The conplexity of the problems lies in, the difflculty of matching supply and
demand. lerrels because of :
- 
the ertraordinarily rapid. grou"th of demand which in the rned.i-un term can only
be estinated with a natr:ral margin of uncertainty;
- 
the long 1ead. tines, inposslble to recluce and. sometines even to ascerbain,
for the provision of essential facilities (construction of power stations and
prod.uction p1ant, ore prospecting). The complexity also stems froro the
Connrnrityrs depend.ence on non-menber countries for its r:ranir:n supplies.
2.
(i) The purpose of a supply policy is to find, solutions suited to the scope and,
conplexity of the problens. The main objectives are first to irnprove the
Cornmunityrs securlty of supply for nuclear fuels by ensuring :
->8-
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(a) ad.equate naterials and services
(b) reasonable prices and
(c) ad.equate stability in d.errelopmentl
arrd. secondly to strengthen the infrastructure of the European fuel ind.ustry,
particularly in ord.er to promote erports of nuclear power plants.
(i:.) There are three nain i-mpli-cations if these objectives are to be attained.:
(a) aiversificatj.on of sources of supply,
(b) establishnent by the European industry of sufficient
capacity to enable it to rneet Comnunlty requirenents ad.equately
and to operate on the world. market.
(c) d.evelopnent of cooperation wlth cor:ntries prod.ucing natr:ral r:raniun.
The nature and. extent of the efforts to be urade justify Cornmr:nity
measllres to ensure long-tern returns on the investnents urad.e by
industry.
(:.:-:-) [o attain the fuIl effect expected. of it, the pol1cy must ad.here to the
elenentary principles of :
- 
non-d.iscrimlnationr although making d.ue allowance for the degree of involvenent
of the parties concerr:ecl;
- 
comrounity of interests of the partners in the d.evelopment of nuclear power;
this nust come to the fore particularly in the event of supply or marketing
d.ifficulties.
-:-:-:-:-
3. Scope
Supplies of nuclear fuels j-nclude supplies of ores, solLce material-s and special
fissile naterialsr together with supplies of services such as enrichnent and renroces-
sing.
As far asthe prod.uction and" d.istri-bution of these fuels is concerned", the conmon supply
policy applies to all the operators involved..
\q --
B. Perrnanent bases
I. Infornation
.11
A thorough Imowled.ge of the world. nuclear fuel narket and. the Connunityrs
supply situation is essentlal for the d.efinitionl inpl-enentation and.
management of measures und.er the conmon policy. Consequentty the Comror:nity
nust have at its d.isposal sufficient clear and rel-iable d.ata collected. and.
processed- at a speed. consistent with the nobility of the market and by
method-s ensuring that trad.e secrets wirr not be d.iscrosed".
A11 this infornation must flow to the Comnission from both und.ertakings
and. statesr either d-irectly or through the Supply Agency. It must coyer in
particular :
- 
the market sitr:ation and future outlook inclrrd.i-ng the sched.uling in tj_rne of
the requirements covered, the origin of supplies and. the level of stocksl
- 
tlestatus a.nd. prospects of nuclear firer prod"uction capacity;
- 
the status and prospects in ore prospecting.
With regard- to the last two points, the Commission intend.s to request
the parties concerned. to forrvard. their programmes and. estinates to it
annually.
z. Ig91er-psgrirogug!:g" lereglg
In parallel with the flow of infornation to the Conrmr:nity authorlties
to enable then to formulate the supply'policy, there roust be a fl-ow of infor-
mation to ind.ividr:al operators to provid.e them with facts a^nd. guid.apce.
This is stipulated in Article 40 of the EAEC Treaty, which read.s :
rrln ord'er to stinulate action by persons and r:nd.ertakings and to facilitate
coordinated- development of their investment in the nuclear field., the
Commission sha1l periodically publish illustrative prog?anmes ind.icating in
particular nuclear enersr prod-uction targets and. al1 the types of investnent
required. for their attainment". In the early d.ays
- 
zB 
- 
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of the nuclear ind.ustry, the programmespublished were d.ocurnentary and. explanatory
rather than lllustrating firm intentions. To neet the new enerry supply sitr.ption
in the Coruor.rnityr which nakes it essential to substitute nucLear for conventional
enerry at a faster rate, these prografimes raust henceforth meet new criteria :
- 
frequent and regular publication,
- 
period of reference consistent with the lead tj.mes inherent i-n investment ilecisions,
- 
credibiLity of targets.
Wj-thout anticipating the results of the stud.ies to be nad.e of the other aspects of
nuclear enerry 1n this context, there must be a fuel supply prograiune that is
capable of future ad.justnent and lays d"own amongst other things long-terro targets
regard.ing the increase in Connunity requirements and their cov€f,&ger
3, Smooth Functioning of the Market
The establishnent of optinurn nuclear fuel supply stability and the develop.ent of an
ind.ustry capable of coveri.ng a substantial proportion of internal d.emand. and of occupying
a satisfactory position on the world. narket can only be achieved by ali-gning the
rnterests and uniti-ng the efforts of Comror:nity producers ancl rs€TSr It shou]d. there-
fore be consolidated by nutual righte and obligations.
To achieve this balance without encroaching on the right of ind.ivid.ual initiatirre,
the Community authorities nust provid.e a franework for the operations of the und.ertakings
concerned..
The ain nust be :
(") to give fuel prod.ucers the guarantee of a large enor:gh narket to ensure the
viability of their urdertaki-ngs, i-n return for their agreenent to reserve a certain
proportion of their output for the Cornnr.mityts requirementsl
(l) to give users 
-and- this also serves the general interest - the guarantee of a
regular flow of supplies for a prolonged. period of time, in return for their
agreement to obtain a certain proportion of their supplies fron the prod-ucers who
have committed. thenselves as d.escribed. und"er (a) above.
A\-
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To inplement such a contractual policy, a list of approved" producers must be drawn
up and. placed at the disposal of users, and consultations rnust be held to d.eteruine
the prior notice which nust be g:-ven for fuel orders arrd. the schedule of corres-
ponding deLiveries, so that the satisfactory expa,nsion of production facilities
is ensured..
In the light of regular reports from the Supply Agency on the workings of the markett
the Connission wlfl be able to keep the Councjrl inforrned andr should. the situation
so require, nake appropriate proposals to itl these proposals would. be deslgned
to prornote the expansion of Europea,n production, wlth due r"egard to its need to
adjust to world narket trend.s.
C. The action pro€rarome
1.@
The first step taken by the Coranunity should be aj-ned. at securi-ng access
to source materials 
- 
and especially natural r:ranium 
- 
by establlshing
suitable cond"itj-ons for the operations of its nining i-nd.ustry in non-nember
countries and on ite own territory.
fn the non-member countries, where nore than gO f" of lqrown reserves are
located.r the Couunr.rnity should explore 1;he possibility of obtaining natural
uranium fron the cor:ntries i^dth which i-t maintains relati-ons. It should
therefore develop appropriate contacts with such countries. In its approach,
the Conmunity nust bear in mlnd the poJ.ici-es pursued by soroe of these
countries to obtain the na.xinurn return fron their natr:ral resources and.
envisage the possibility of ind.ustrial cooperation between Europe and. the
country concerrred. for the enrichrnent oll natural uranium.
The Commission intend-s to make an immed-iate approach to countries harring
natural uranium resources, in ord-er to explore ways of facilitating the
attainment of the Corununityrs supply targets.
With the developing countries the Conrnunity could e:ca,mine what scope there
isr in their scheme of d.eveloprnent prioritiesr. for fj-nancial participation
in prospecting a"nd prod.uction and assoc,iated infrastructure d.evelopnent.
At the sane time the Coronunity should encourage the id.entification and utiliz-
ation of its own resources and foster efforts by Ebropean companies to strenghthen
thelr lndustri.al base.
In this connectionr it rnust be possible to prepare the d.evelopnent of certain
reserves 
- 
trearthbound stocksrr capable of supplenenting, if necessary, the
security stocks rnentionecl below.
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It nust therefore be possible for the Corornurity to participate financially in the
oost of prospecting campaigns.
2. Production
In helping to set up a prod.uction ind.ustry which satisfi-es an ad-equate proportion of
its requlrenentsr the Cornmr:nity camot confine itself to the orga,ni-zation of
the narket and. rneasures to secure access to source naterials, but nust also
provid"e technological a.nd. ind.ustrial incentives.
In j.ts cornrnunication to the Corxrcil entitled. rrfrrerry for Europe : Research
arrd- Development" (SnC (Za) 2592 ftna.I), tne Comraission has alrea{y ind.icated.
the areas in which concertecl efforts eould be nade or i-ntensified- in connection
with nuclear supnlies :
reprocessing nethod.s; mainly for ad-vanced. fue1s,
erbraction of uranium from low-grade ores a,nd as a by-prod.uct of the
phosphate ind.ustry.
It no'rr suggests the ad.d.ition of :
- 
advanced. nethod.s of ore prospecting arr'd ilressing, including the analysis of
mineralization phenomena,
- 
ad.vanced. enrichment methocls.
The Commission plans to consult the circles i-nterested. j-n the d.eveloiment
of these technologies and. then to report to the Cor:rrcll on the possibilities
of provid.i-ng Connr.mity incentives. In its Resolution of { Jr:ne 1974 concerning
the supply of enri-ched. uraniurn to the Comnunity, the Council recommeniled rrthat
the exchanges of views between prod-ucers contlnue with a view to concerted.,
har"monious development of tbe existing projects as long as the situation requires'r.
The Comnission consi-d.ers that siniLar consultatlons must cover the whole nuclear
fuel production sector. In ad.d.ition, because of the low elasticity of the
rrprocluotion-uti-lizationrr system, consultation between prod.ucers and. users 
-
started. in the consultative commlttee of the supply Agency and. the standing
Conmittee on Uranium &rrichment 
- 
should. be stepped up. The Cornmission intends
to make the necessary steps and will keep the Council informed. of d.eveloprnents
in the situation.
-&:
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Fina1ly, in the Commissionts view *r?_-P**ity should be able to offer support
by granting joint r.rnd"ertaking status\*/to undertakings engaged in prospecting
or prod.uction and also to r:ndertakings having research and- d.erreloprnent activities.
Projects encouragecl" in this way would benefit fron the adrrantages resulting
fron their Comnurrity nature'
Despi-te the possibilities for ci.eveloping a Cornmunity enrichnent capaci-tyt
the Commr:nity will continue to rely on non-nenber countries for at least some
of its nuclear fuel supplies. It i-s therefore essentj.al that Connunity ind.ustry
should see' ways of pa.rtici-pa,ting as much as possible in the derrelopnent of
enrichnent in the cor:ntries where natural rira.nir:m reserves are focateil.
3. Etocks
Any decision to bui-1d. up stocks to a voluroe consistent with the economic
and. life characteristi.cs of nuclear fuels rnust be taken at Couutunity lerrelt
as in the case of other energ,' prod.ucing: materials.
The nain purpose of keeping stocks ls to increase security of supply. There are
other reasons, such as regular supply cond.itions and the fact that by enabllng
nnad'n*;on to be spread out evenly, stocks facil-itate the comnissioning ofyr vs4v v I
Coruounity facilities.
The Counlssion will consult the interested circles and if the results bear out
the benefit of such action at Connuni-ty level, it wj-I1 submit suitable proposals
to the Council.
4. Supply difficulties
fhe Cornnunity must also plan a number of'measures to be taken in the event of supply
d.ifficulties. In particular it rnust prepare 
- 
as it has d.one for other enerry
prod.ucing materials 
- 
a scheme for the a.l"location of resources i-n ti.rnes of crisist
laying d.ovrn the li-rnlts and arrangements for generaf or selective interdependence
and the nachinery to set the alLocation schene in motionr In the sarne contedr a
reinsurance scheme in the event of failure should. be established between prod.ucers.
The Conralssion intends to consult the }lernber States on the principles of the
scheme and. then subr:oit to the Corrncil a communication outlinins the measures to
be taken in the event of difflculties.
(x) Cirapter V, trlASC
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D. The role of the Supply Ag,ency
If the measures in the progralnme outlined. above are to be effecti've, the
Comnunity nust harre a suitable instrr:ment capable of acting in the public
interest with the speecL and. flexibility caIled. for by narket cond.itions.
This instrument alread.y exists : it is the suppi-y Agency. rt has legal
personality ancL financial autonorny but is r:nd.er the supervision of the
Conroission which issues d.irectives to it and. has a right of rreto orrer its
d.ecisions. The Comnunity need. only continue to use this instrument, after
red"efining its sphere of action and. the principles guid.ing its work.
The Agency whose chief role is to facil"itate the flow of supplies to all
Connr:nity users, is actirre in the following fields ;
- 
the conclusion of contracts,
L implementation of the conmon polioy,
- 
lnformation 
- 
whicb is related to its no::nal activities.
f1he Agencyrs right to participate in the conclusion of supply contracts
when one of the parties is a Cornmunity prod.ucer or user enables it :
- 
to ensure that the principle of non-discrinination is observed., with the
necessary nnocLi-fications to take account of the involrrenent of the parties;
- 
to ensure that supply contracts are in conformity with
the policy regard.ing the ord.erly supply of the marketg
- 
possiblJrr on a d.irective of the Connission; to intervene itself.
[lhe irnplementation of the conmon policy, which must express the general
objectirres in practical terms, covers a^n;r tasks assigned. by a Comission
d'irective after a Decision of the Council, in particular the preparation and.,
where appropri.ate, carrying out of measures to overcone supply d.ifficultiesr
Infor"sration on narket trend.s (requirernents, availabilitiesl erbent to which
d.enand. is covered., prevailing prices)rwhile not d.isclosing trad.e secrets,
enables I
,- )b-
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- 
the Conmu:rity authoritj-es to shape the supply policyt
- 
producers and users to obtain a cl-earer view of the marketr which will help
them in their operations.
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DRAFT RESOLINION
on the d.evelopment of nuclear enerry
in the Corununity
TI]E MUNCIL OF TI{E Ei]NOPEAII CO}ffUNITIES
Ilaving regard. to the Comnr:nications from the Conmission entitled:
- 
Promotion of the use of nuclear 
"rr"tryl
- 
Towards a Comnr:nlty supply policyz
- 
Connunity enerry policy: objective f9853
Whereas the EAEC Treaty entrusts the Cornmr:nity with the task of creating the
cond.itions necessary for the speedy establishment and growth of nuclear ind.ustries
and. having regard to the guid,elines ad.opted by the Council on 1J September L974;
Whereas, in its Resolution of U September L974t the Cor:ncil ad.opted. certain
guid.elines concerning nuclear enersr;
trlhereas the Cornmunityrs present enerry supply situation and. future prospects
d.emand that all enerry resources accessible to the Cornmr:nity be harnessed, a^nd.
whereas, consequently, nuclear enerry is required. to contribute substantially to
the coirerage of the Commr:nityrs enerry requirements r,rhile a1so, like alI other
forms of enerry, conplying with the d.eroand.s of ecologr, economy a"nd. security of
supply.
Whereas, with a view to the achievement of the above mer:tioned. objectives, the
Connunity must contribute toward.s the protection of the publie against the hazards
inherent in the use of nuclear enerry and whereas it should continue and increase
its efforts to streng:bhen the ind.ustrial, sclentific and technological base and
improve the security of nuclear fuel supplies;
lcnrvl(Z+)rO finat, I February L9T4
2colvi 14./ryal
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1. Takes note of the plan of action presented by the Conrnissi-on in its Conrnuni-
'l
cation* on the protection of the public and strengthening of the ind.ustrialt
scientific and technological base I
2. Affi:ms the need., in ord.er to improve the security of nuclear fuel suppliest
to d.efine and implement a Connr:nity policy coveringr in particularl
- 
the d.evelopnent of reliable resources in the Conrnunlty and. access to such
resources in non-rnember countries;
- 
the promotion of an ind.ustry capable of' covering a,n adequate proportion of
the Comnunityrs requirernents and of operating on a uorld. narketl
- 
the institution of cooperation with natr:ral uranium prod.ucing countries;
- 
the d.evelopnent of research to pronote technolog'ical innovation.
3. Declares that sueh a policy shouLd. be carried. out by the following means:
- 
analgamation of national and. Community efforts;
- 
a constant supply of accr.lrate and. harmonized- information;
- 
consultations rdth ind.ustrial operators.
4. Recognizes that the inplications of such a policy are as follows:
(a) tfre illustrative progranrnes provided for under Article 40 of the EAEC Treaty
must be d.ram up annually;
(t) tfre Comnr:ni.ty must contribute toward"s strengthening ind.ustrial nuclear
potential, in particular,
- 
by naking a financial contribution to ore prospecting canpaigns;
- 
by encouraging ad.equa.te ad.vrance notice of nucfear fuel orders to those
r:ndertakings drich ag?ee to supply the Commr:nity regularly;
lcOiu (Z+) I0 finat of 1 February r).1{.
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- 
by coordinating anc[, where appropriate, participating in the constitutlon of
sto cks:
(") the Supply Agency must serve a.s an essential instrument for implementing the
conrnon policy;
5. Underlines that this policy must be backed. by cooperation with non-menber coqntries:
6. confirms the r:rgency of the need to nake progress in these fields,at both cougaunity
and national leve1s;
7. Invites the Member States and. und.ertaki.ngs to assist the Comroission in the preparati-on
of practical proposals to be subnitted. to the Council.
